Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Australian educational settings: a prospective cohort study.

School closures have occurred globally during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, empiric data on transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children and in educational settings are scarce. In Australia, most schools have remained open during the first epidemic wave, albeit with reduced student physical attendance at the epidemic peak. We examined SARS-CoV-2 transmission among children and staff in schools and early childhood education and care (ECEC) settings in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW). Laboratory-confirmed paediatric (aged ≤18 years) and adult COVID-19 cases who attended a school or ECEC setting while considered infectious (defined as 24 h before symptom onset based on national guidelines during the study period) in NSW from Jan 25 to April 10, 2020, were investigated for onward transmission. All identified school and ECEC settings close contacts were required to home quarantine for 14 days, and were monitored and offered SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid testing if symptomatic. Enhanced investigations in selected educational settings included nucleic acid testing and SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing in symptomatic and asymptomatic contacts. Secondary attack rates were calculated and compared with state-wide COVID-19 rates. 15 schools and ten ECEC settings had children (n=12) or adults (n=15) attend while infectious, with 1448 contacts monitored. Of these, 633 (43·7%) of 1448 had nucleic acid testing, or antibody testing, or both, with 18 secondary cases identified (attack rate 1·2%). Five secondary cases (three children; two adults) were identified (attack rate 0·5%; 5/914) in three schools. No secondary transmission occurred in nine of ten ECEC settings among 497 contacts. However, one outbreak in an ECEC setting involved transmission to six adults and seven children (attack rate 35·1%; 13/37). Across all settings, five (28·0%) of 18 secondary infections were asymptomatic (three infants [all aged 1 year], one adolescent [age 15 years], and one adult). SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates were low in NSW educational settings during the first COVID-19 epidemic wave, consistent with mild infrequent disease in the 1·8 million child population. With effective case-contact testing and epidemic management strategies and associated small numbers of attendances while infected, children and teachers did not contribute significantly to COVID-19 transmission via attendance in educational settings. These findings could be used to inform modelling and public health policy regarding school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. NSW Government Department of Health.

Macartney K ，Quinn HE ，Pillsbury AJ ，Koirala A ，Deng L ，Winkler N ，Katelaris AL ，O'Sullivan MVN ，Dalton C ，Wood N ，NSW COVID-19 Schools Study Team ... -  《-》

Determining the optimal strategy for reopening schools, the impact of test and trace interventions, and the risk of occurrence of a second COVID-19 epidemic wave in the UK: a modelling study.

As lockdown measures to slow the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection begin to ease in the UK, it is important to assess the impact of any changes in policy, including school reopening and broader relaxation of physical distancing measures. We aimed to use an individual-based model to predict the impact of two possible strategies for reopening schools to all students in the UK from September, 2020, in combination with different assumptions about relaxation of physical distancing measures and the scale-up of testing. In this modelling study, we used Covasim, a stochastic individual-based model for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, calibrated to the UK epidemic. The model describes individuals' contact networks stratified into household, school, workplace, and community layers, and uses demographic and epidemiological data from the UK. We simulated six different scenarios, representing the combination of two school reopening strategies (full time and a part-time rota system with 50% of students attending school on alternate weeks) and three testing scenarios (68% contact tracing with no scale-up in testing, 68% contact tracing with sufficient testing to avoid a second COVID-19 wave, and 40% contact tracing with sufficient testing to avoid a second COVID-19 wave). We estimated the number of new infections, cases, and deaths, as well as the effective reproduction number (R) under different strategies. In a sensitivity analysis to account for uncertainties within the stochastic simulation, we also simulated infectiousness of children and young adults aged younger than 20 years at 50% relative to older ages (20 years and older). With increased levels of testing (between 59% and 87% of symptomatic people tested at some point during an active SARS-CoV-2 infection, depending on the scenario), and effective contact tracing and isolation, an epidemic rebound might be prevented. Assuming 68% of contacts could be traced, we estimate that 75% of individuals with symptomatic infection would need to be tested and positive cases isolated if schools return full-time in September, or 65% if a part-time rota system were used. If only 40% of contacts could be traced, these figures would increase to 87% and 75%, respectively. However, without these levels of testing and contact tracing, reopening of schools together with gradual relaxing of the lockdown measures are likely to induce a second wave that would peak in December, 2020, if schools open full-time in September, and in February, 2021, if a part-time rota system were adopted. In either case, the second wave would result in R rising above 1 and a resulting second wave of infections 2·0-2·3 times the size of the original COVID-19 wave. When infectiousness of children and young adults was varied from 100% to 50% of that of older ages, we still found that a comprehensive and effective test-trace-isolate strategy would be required to avoid a second COVID-19 wave. To prevent a second COVID-19 wave, relaxation of physical distancing, including reopening of schools, in the UK must be accompanied by large-scale, population-wide testing of symptomatic individuals and effective tracing of their contacts, followed by isolation of diagnosed individuals. None.

Panovska-Griffiths J ，Kerr CC ，Stuart RM ，Mistry D ，Klein DJ ，Viner RM ，Bonell C ... -  《-》

Understanding SARS-CoV-2 Delta and Omicron variant transmission and vaccine impact in schools and child-care settings in Australia: a population-based study.

Over 214 million students globally have been affected by school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. To address knowledge gaps on transmission of SARS-CoV-2 delta (B.1.617.2) and omicron (B.1.1.529) variants in educational settings we examined virus transmission in schools and early childhood education and care settings (ECECs) in New South Wales (NSW), Australia in relation to mitigation measures, including COVID-19 vaccination. Secondary transmission from children and adults with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection who attended a school (n = 3170) or ECECs (n = 5800) while infectious was investigated over two periods: 1) June 16 to September 18, 2021 (delta outbreak), and; 2) October 18 to December 18, 2021 (delta and omicron; schools only). Close contacts of cases underwent 14 days quarantine and SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid testing. Secondary attack rates (SARs) were calculated and compared with state-wide notification data, school attendance, and vaccination status. 1187 schools and 300 ECECs had students (n = 1349) or staff (n = 440) attend while infectious. Of 24,277 contacts investigated, most (91.8%; 22,297/24,277) were tested and 912 secondary cases identified. The secondary attack rate (SAR) was 5.9% in 139 ECECs and 3.5% in 312 schools. The risk of becoming a secondary case was higher in unvaccinated school staff (OR 4.7; 95% CI: 1.7-13.3), particularly ECEC staff (OR 9.0; 95% CI: 3.6-22.7) and unvaccinated school students than in vaccinated school staff. SARs were similar for delta (4.9%) and omicron BA.1 (4.1%) in the unvaccinated and higher compared with vaccinated contacts (0.9% and 3.4%, respectively). Increasing school attendance rates raised case incursions and secondary case numbers, but not community-wide infection rates. Vaccination reduced SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates in schools, although less so for omicron than delta variants. Despite higher community-based transmission rates, in-school transmission remained low and stable with high attendance, suggesting that community restrictions, rather than school closures, best mitigated COVID-19 impacts. NSW Government Department of Health.

Koirala A ，Winkler NE ，Quinn HE ，Gardiner E ，Liu B ，Forbes J ，Sharpe C ，van Tussenbroek T ，Wood N ，Macartney K ... -  《-》

Epidemiology and transmission of COVID-19 in 391 cases and 1286 of their close contacts in Shenzhen, China: a retrospective cohort study.

Rapid spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in Wuhan, China, prompted heightened surveillance in Shenzhen, China. The resulting data provide a rare opportunity to measure key metrics of disease course, transmission, and the impact of control measures. From Jan 14 to Feb 12, 2020, the Shenzhen Center for Disease Control and Prevention identified 391 SARS-CoV-2 cases and 1286 close contacts. We compared cases identified through symptomatic surveillance and contact tracing, and estimated the time from symptom onset to confirmation, isolation, and admission to hospital. We estimated metrics of disease transmission and analysed factors influencing transmission risk. Cases were older than the general population (mean age 45 years) and balanced between males (n=187) and females (n=204). 356 (91%) of 391 cases had mild or moderate clinical severity at initial assessment. As of Feb 22, 2020, three cases had died and 225 had recovered (median time to recovery 21 days; 95% CI 20-22). Cases were isolated on average 4·6 days (95% CI 4·1-5·0) after developing symptoms; contact tracing reduced this by 1·9 days (95% CI 1·1-2·7). Household contacts and those travelling with a case were at higher risk of infection (odds ratio 6·27 [95% CI 1·49-26·33] for household contacts and 7·06 [1·43-34·91] for those travelling with a case) than other close contacts. The household secondary attack rate was 11·2% (95% CI 9·1-13·8), and children were as likely to be infected as adults (infection rate 7·4% in children <10 years vs population average of 6·6%). The observed reproductive number (R) was 0·4 (95% CI 0·3-0·5), with a mean serial interval of 6·3 days (95% CI 5·2-7·6). Our data on cases as well as their infected and uninfected close contacts provide key insights into the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2. This analysis shows that isolation and contact tracing reduce the time during which cases are infectious in the community, thereby reducing the R. The overall impact of isolation and contact tracing, however, is uncertain and highly dependent on the number of asymptomatic cases. Moreover, children are at a similar risk of infection to the general population, although less likely to have severe symptoms; hence they should be considered in analyses of transmission and control. Emergency Response Program of Harbin Institute of Technology, Emergency Response Program of Peng Cheng Laboratory, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Bi Q ，Wu Y ，Mei S ，Ye C ，Zou X ，Zhang Z ，Liu X ，Wei L ，Truelove SA ，Zhang T ，Gao W ，Cheng C ，Tang X ，Wu X ，Wu Y ，Sun B ，Huang S ，Sun Y ，Zhang J ，Ma T ，Lessler J ，Feng T ... -  《-》

Preventing and Mitigating SARS-CoV-2 Transmission - Four Overnight Camps, Maine, June-August 2020.

Blaisdell LL ，Cohn W ，Pavell JR ，Rubin DS ，Vergales JE ... -  《-》